Lineagei
Frameworki
What's Anchor?
Batteries-included Rust framework. Ships account-validation codegen, 8-byte instruction discriminators, and an on-chain IDL — the program describes itself.
Bigger binary and higher rent in exchange for safety rails, introspection, and dev speed. The choice of a team optimizing for correctness over on-chain footprint.
Originally Coral (Armani Ferrante); now community-maintained.
What it is
The de facto standard. Rust macros (#[program], #[derive(Accounts)]) eliminate boilerplate: it auto-generates 8-byte account and instruction discriminators — SHA256("account:<Name>")[..8] and SHA256("global:<ix>")[..8] — handles Borsh (de)serialization, enforces account constraints declaratively (mut, has_one, seeds, init), and emits a JSON IDL that client libraries consume directly. The cost: Borsh copies data on every deserialize (not zero-copy), and the macro machinery adds binary bloat and compute overhead — irrelevant for ~99% of programs.
When to pick it
Building a new protocol, moving fast, or wanting maximum ecosystem compatibility. It's the beginner default and stays the right call for most production programs.
How it looks on-chain
The most recognizable framework. Every account it owns begins with an 8-byte discriminator, and the IDL is often published on-chain at a PDA derived from the program id. Both are strong, reliable fingerprints — this is the only framework we can label with confidence.
Others in the wild: Steel (Ore team — near-native performance on solana-program), Seahorse (Python → Anchor), and Poseidon & Quasar (TypeScript → Rust). Transpilers inherit their lowering target's fingerprint: a Quasar or Poseidon program that compiles down to Anchor will look like Anchor on-chain — discriminators and all.
Anchor docsFootprinti
Recovered architecturei
Reachi
Controli
What's upgrade authority?
The upgrade authority is the account allowed to replace a program's code after it's deployed.
If it's set (mutable), that key can push new bytecode at any time — including malicious code, the classic "rug" vector. If it's null (immutable / frozen), the code can never change; what 's on-chain is final. A Squads multisig sits in between — upgrades are possible but need M-of-N signers, not one hot wallet. So mutable + single hot-wallet = highest risk; immutable or multisig = stronger guarantees.
What's a verified build?
A verified build proves the program running on-chain was compiled from the public source you can read — nothing hidden.
Someone re-compiles the source in a deterministic (Docker) environment and checks the resulting bytecode is byte-for-byte identical to what's deployed; tools like solana-verify do this and record it with a verification service. "Not verified" isn't a red flag by itself — most programs simply never submit one. It just means you're trusting the deployed bytecode as-is, with no source cross-check.
Convictioni
Interface — the on-chain IDLi
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GUM Universal Swap — Solana edge-swap fulfillment contract
Instructions 2
deliver_usdc
Degraded-mode delivery: hand the recipient the escrowed USDC as-is. The recipient may claim anytime; anyone else only after `deadline + DELIVER_GRACE_SECS` — before that, fulfillers get an exclusive window to clear the swap floor.
- callersignerwritable
- escrow_authority
- escrow_usdcwritable
- usdc_mint
- recipient
- recipient_usdc_atawritable
- token_program
- associated_token_program
- system_program
- event_authority
- program
- intent_blobbytes
fulfill
Permissionless fulfillment: swap the escrowed USDC into the intent's dst token via Jupiter and deliver to the recipient, enforcing `min_final_out` from the self-certifying blob. `jupiter_ix_data` is the raw data of a Jupiter v6 swap instruction quoted with `userPublicKey = escrow PDA` and `destinationTokenAccount = recipient's dst ATA`; its account metas ride in as remaining accounts. Neither needs trust: the program id is pinned, the escrow only signs via CPI, and delivery is measured on the recipient's balance.
- payersignerwritable
- escrow_authority
- escrow_usdcwritable
- usdc_mint
- dst_mint
- recipient
- recipient_dst_atawritable
- jupiter_program
- token_program
- associated_token_program
- system_program
- event_authority
- program
- intent_blobbytes
- jupiter_ix_databytes
Types 2
EdgeFulfilledstruct
- intent_id[u8; 32]
- usdc_inu64
- dst_outu64
- dst_mintpubkey
- recipientpubkey
- callerpubkey
EdgeUsdcDeliveredstruct
- intent_id[u8; 32]
- amountu64
- recipientpubkey
- callerpubkey
Events 2
EdgeFulfilled
no fields
EdgeUsdcDelivered
no fields
Errors 12
- 6000BadBlobintent blob is malformed
- 6001UnsupportedBlobVersionunsupported intent blob version
- 6002WrongChainintent's destination chain is not Solana
- 6003EscrowMismatchescrow authority does not match the blob's intent id
- 6004EscrowEmptyescrow holds no USDC (not yet funded, or already settled)
- 6005DstMintMismatchdst mint does not hash to the blob's dst token commitment
- 6006RecipientMismatchrecipient does not match the blob
- 6007MinFinalOutOverflowmin_final_out exceeds u64 — unfulfillable on SVM
- 6008FloorNotMetrecipient received less than the intent's min_final_out
- 6009EscrowNotDrainedswap did not spend the full escrow balance
- 6010DeliverNotYetPermissionlessonly the recipient may deliver USDC before deadline + grace
- 6011InvalidTokenAccounttoken account invalid for this instruction
What's an IDL?
An IDL — Interface Description Language — is a JSON spec that describes how to talk to a program: its instructions, the accounts each one needs, argument and account types, events, and errors.
Anchor auto-generates it at build time. A program can publish it on-chain at a PDA derived from its id, so any client or explorer can decode the program's transactions without its source code.
Why it's often missing
Publishing is opt-in — a courtesy, not a requirement. Many programs never do, and non-Anchor frameworks (Pinocchio, native, Steel) don't produce one at all; their interface lives in an off-chain Shank/Codama artifact, or nowhere public. Absence means you can't auto-decode it — not that anything is wrong.
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